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I. INTRODUCTION
I have written, spoken, and taught extensively on the interface between law
and science for the past thirty-five years. During this period I have been an
invited participant or speaker at many conferences that were primarily gather-
ings of scientists, engineers, and the like. In 1975 I was one of the five nonscien-
tists' invited to participate in the Asilomar International Conference on Recom-
binant Molecules of DNA.' On the first evening of the Conference while
walking to the dining hall, I was joined by a prominent young molecular biolo-
gist, and we exchanged introductions. Noting that my name badge said only
"George Washington University," he asked about my affiliation with the univer-
sity. When I identified myself as a law professor, his shock was evident. "What
are you doing here?" he asked. The only appropriately modest answer I could
give was that I had been invited. It was obvious that my new.friend's perception
of lawyers was that we were concerned solely with litigation, and he could not
conceive that litigation was in any way relevant to the subject matter of the
Conference. The essence of this experience has been repeated many times
before and since.
Unfortunately, the legal profession, including that part of it in academia,
has likewise had difficulty in understanding law professors who are involved
with science. Not uncommonly, when I meet lawyers or law teachers who ask
what I teach, they are baffled when I mention that my academic specialty is the
law-science relationship. To move the conversation along, they typically opine
that I must be interested in how computers and other new technologies can
facilitate the work of lawyers and courts; or that I must be into intellectual
property and patents; or that my ambit is medical malpractice; or that I must
teach Evidence and am particularly interested in scientific expert witnesses; or
perhaps that I am one of the odd academic ducks who seek to enrich the educa-
tion of law students by "teaching them about science." In fact, none of these is
an accurate description. The study of the law-science relationship, as I define it,
seeks to determine how the various processes of law-primarily judicial and
legislative-respond to changes brought about by scientific advances. It is this
aspect of the interface between law and science that forms the basis of this
Article.
* Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. A.B. 1942, J.D. 1948, Univer-
sity of Chicago.
1. Interestingly, all five were lawyers.
2. Asilomar is regarded as an historic event in the annals of science. In 1974 the leading researchers in
recombinant DNA called for a moratorium on further research because of their concerns about possibly unaccept-
able hazards. The call for the moratorium was generally accepted throughout the world. The 1975 Asilomar
Conference brought together the world's leading recombinant DNA researchers to discuss the hazards and to
consider what should be done about the moratorium.
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II. A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE
Although the 1989-90 edition of the Directory of Law Teachers lists more
than one hundred law teachers who report that they teach in the Law and Sci-
ence field, which is defined to include "Technology Assessment" and
"Jurimetrics," 3 legal academics and other scholars struggle to understand and
explain the justification for the involvement of law schools in this field. Follow-
ing is a discussion of some recent scholarship addressing this issue.
Steven Goldberg has emerged in recent years as a leading scholar in the
law-science field. His general approach is to look at the relationship from the
perspective of science. His starting point is to inquire how "various legal doc-
trines apply to [science]" just as we look at how various legal doctrines apply to
corporations.4 That law schools offer courses on law and science suggests to him
that science is sufficiently distinctive, unlike screwdrivers, for example, to war-
rant "specialized treatment."'5 The catalogue of what is distinctive about science
"becomes a list of the central dogmas of law and science."'6
Before proceeding to develop this catalogue, Goldberg attempts to define
"law" and "science" for this purpose. He defines "law" as "focus[ing] on public
ordering of private institutions" and "science" as "the pursuit of testable knowl-
edge about the natural world."' He then goes out of his way (significantly in
light of his further position as discussed below) to note that the latter definition
includes "financial support for research as well as regulation of that research." 8
Goldberg also posits four central dogmas of science. These are:
I' Community, meaning that there is generally a consensus or near consen-
sus among scientists on scientific judgments, making it rational in many cases
for nonscientists to rely on the scientific community's views in forming their
own scientific judgments;9
* Progress, meaning that science has a forward momentum, and that it is
the goal of every scientist to move science forward;1 °
* Empiricism, meaning that science believes that scientific
theories can be tested; 1 and
* Externalities, meaning that scientific activity often generates effects on a
wide variety of interests far beyond the ambit of the researcher.12
3. THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1989-90, at 1005. To the best of my knowledge, no one has
undertaken a canvass of the kinds and content of the courses they teach. Eighteen teachers say they have taught
in the field for more than ten years. Id. at 1006.
4. Goldberg, The Central Dogmas of Law and Science, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 371, 371 (1986).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 372.
8. Id. Presumably Goldberg intends "funding" to mean government funding and "regulation" to mean
government regulation of government-funded research. One might ask whether government-funded research is
ever really "regulated," or whether what passes for regulation is merely a condition of the funding.
9. Id. at 372-75.
10. Id. at 377.
I1. Id. at 377-79.
12. Id. at 379-80.
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In a subsequent article13 Goldberg seeks a "framework for understanding
what happens when legal controls are applied to science. ' 14 He finds that the
fundamental difference between the disciplines is that science emphasizes pro-
gress while law emphasizes process, that is, "the peaceful resolution of human
disputes.' 5 The tensions between law and science, Goldberg argues, increase as
scientific research advances from basic research to its technological applications.
This may be a self-evident proposition, particularly since Goldberg seems (al-
though this is not entirely clear) to equate law's "treatment of science" with
"regulation.' 6 After all, scientific research usually does not have much direct
potential for causing injury by itself. One can visualize, of course, that research
in a laboratory can result in an explosion or the release of toxic agents into the
environment, but good laboratory practices generally obviate any need for exter-
nal regulation.' 7 Although this premise may not be particularly revealing, what
is interesting is the way in which Goldberg constructs his argument.
Goldberg's bottom line is that analysis of the law's treatment of basic re-
search-even when mission-oriented--exposes a "remarkable degree of defer-
ence to the scientific community."" This conclusion is based solely on the out-
comes of four federal court cases. In three of these cases the courts refused to
grant relief to applicants for federal grants whose applications had been re-
jected by the funding agencies; 19 in the fourth case the court rejected out of
hand a suit brought pro se by a member of the public for a writ of mandamus
to compel the funding of research on whether a particular substance could cure
cancer.20 Goldberg contrasts this "judicial abdication" with the manner in
which the courts review denials of disability claims by the Social Security Ad-
ministration; in those cases the courts grant relief about half the time.2
Goldberg finds judicial abstinence in the research funding area to be an indica-
tion that science is one of the few areas in American life where something re-
flecting a consensus exists as to what is, and what is not, good work. 2 He ig-
nores a much more compelling rationale: that social security is an entitlement
program giving claimants the right to compensation if they meet certain crite-
13. Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEo. L.J. 1341 (1987).
14. Id. at 1342.
15. Id. at 1342, 1345. It would be more accurate to define law as "the optimal resolution of human dis-
putes," which, of course, would include "peaceful resolution." Goldberg would undoubtedly agree, in any event,
that law does not emphasize the objectively correct resolution of human disputes. See infra text accompanying
note 123.
16. Id. at 1352.
17. There are, of course, some kinds of research that may be subject to government restrictions, such as
research on human subjects. It is not clear whether Goldberg defines "regulation" to include government restric-
tions imposed contractually as a condition of a contract or grant. This Article rejects such a definition.
18. Goldberg, supra note 13, at 1352. Although Goldberg seems to equate technology with "commercially
important products," id. at 1364, the fact is that the law may intervene even at the research stage when the
research involves experiments or other actions that may be perceived as dangerous.
19. Id. at 1355-58. See Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); Grassetti v. Weinberger, 408 F.
Supp. 142 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Apter v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. III. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 351 (7th
Cir. 1975).
20. Goldberg, supra note 13 at 1358-59. See Mannoff v. HEW, 456 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
mem., 595 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913 (1979).
21. Goldberg, supra note 13, at 1360-61.
22. Id. at 1361.
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ria; but no scientist is entitled to a research grant except in the nonarbitrary,
noncapricious, nondiscriminatory discretion of the granting agency.
On the other hand, Goldberg argues, when research evolves into technol-
ogy, legal control takes over "with a vengeance. '2 3 This gives rise to a "regula-
tory gap" between research and application with "enormous practical conse-
quences." 4 He sees the possibility of narrowing the gap in two ways: law and
regulators could move into the basic science area; or scientists could move into
the task of steering science along the lines of social realities.25 His preference
seems to be the latter possibility, and he speaks of the emergence of a new
profession, the "science counselor," who would work to help shape science to
meet regulatory constraints.28
Another commentator, Robert Merges, takes a narrower view of the rela-
tionship. 7 After a cursory, and not completely accurate, review of the history of
"law and science" courses in law school curricula, he criticizes Goldberg's ten-
dency to discuss legal issues only from the perspective of the scientist.2 " This,
says Merges, "still leaves technical issues in the hands of scientists" and "seems
to run the risk of further enshrining the priesthood of science, thereby reinforc-
ing the amateur status of legal actors.129 Accordingly, he argues that Law and
Science courses should expose students to "basic scientific sources and institu-
tions" and to "technical material sufficient to familiarize students with scientific
methods. 30
The Merges view reflects a sentiment frequently articulated by scientists
who find lawyers involved in their affairs.3 ' As Merges puts it, "The need to
educate amateurs to understand and manage legal disputes having a scientific
dimension is at the heart of the problem that the academic field of Law and
Science must address. '3 2 A leading scientist who expresses this view is Maxine
Singer.3 3 Dr. Singer can claim some familiarity with the law and its ways since
her husband is a prominent lawyer. In fact, she was a doctoral candidate in
23. 23. Id. at 1364.
24. Id. at 1368. The gap may not be as substantial as Goldberg argues. The legal system has developed an
interest in some fruits of scientific research short of technology. For example, the restrictions on recombinant
DNA activities were directed primarily against research-type experiments and not against products flowing from
the science.
25. Id. at 1379.
26. Id. at 1380. Goldberg acknowledges that the science counselor would become a competitor of the
lawyer.
27. Merges, The Nature and Necessity of Law and Science, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 315 (1988).
28. "The goal seems not so much to instruct students about legal issues as to educate them about the
divergence between how scientists and lawyers approach problems." Id. at 325.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 326-27.
31. The author has frequently encountered this sentiment when he has spoken before scientific groups on
such matters as benefit-risk assessment or the nuclear power licensing process and has expressed views that the
audience found unsettling. A not atypical reaction is a question such as "Would you please tell us exactly what
education you have had in physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, etc?" There is usually a sense of satisfaction
and triumph when the author's response is, "For your purposes, essentially zero."
32. Id. at 324-25.
33. Singer, Genetics and the Law: A Scientist's View, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 315 (1985).
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biochemistry at Yale at the same time her husband studied law there, and she
was very much involved with the law school community.34
Dr. Singer believes that most lawyers and judges "are incapable of dealing
adequately with technical issftes" because during their secondary school educa-
tion they "decided not to learn any more science."5 This scientific ignorance is
dangerous because when choices are made at the societal level, even a single
well-placed individual "can manipulate scientific ignorance and consequent
fears into support for irrational, almost primitive myths. 36 Her example of this
is the havoc wreaked by the Soviet agronomist, T. D. Lysenko, in the 1930s
when he successfully established as official Soviet policy his opinion that "classi-
cal genetics was all wrong. ' 37 But Lysenko was not ignorant of science; he was
a scientist, albeit, as Dr. Singer notes, "admittedly poorly educated,' 38 and an
ideologue to boot. 9
Dr. Singer attempts to demonstrate that lawyers are not "up to the task"
of "societal evaluation" of "biology's potential for both good and evil" by quot-
ing a passage from the "background" section of Judge Sirica's opinion in Foun-
dation on Economic Trends v. Heckler:40
A little over a decade ago scientists developed the capability of modifying genetic
material in the laboratory. Through a process of splitting and recombining a subcellu-
lar unit known as DNA, laboratory scientists could begin to control the natural
processes of organism reproduction and growth. The product of this process of altering
natural hereditary material is generally known by the name "recombinant DNA." The
use of this process has been limited to small organisms, usually bacteria."'
Dr. Singer does not criticize the substance of Judge Sirica's effort. Instead, al-
most ad hominem, she asks: "Did the judge's training and knowledge provide a
reasonable basis for writing this paragraph?" 42 Could the lawyers before the
court understand this paragraph? Well enough to know whether it is accurate
and precise in nature?43
Dr. Singer offers a concrete suggestion for "beginning to bridge the gap
between law and science" as a step towards the "real goal, the scientific educa-
tion of the entire citizenry." She suggests including in the Law School Admis-
sions Test "a set of questions concerning science." '44 At the same time, she ex-
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id. at 319.
36. Id. at 320.
37. Id. at 320-23.
38. Id. at 320.
39. Id. at 323. Lawyers generally are not ideologues, but one of their functions is to attempt to articulate
science in a manner that supports their client's position.
40. 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984), affid in part and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 755.
42. She does not discuss the likelihood, or the implications of the likelihood, that the passage may have
come from, or may have paraphrased, evidence or a portion of a party's brief.
43. Why are these questions relevant, let alone important, since the quoted material has no conceivable
operative significance? Dr. Singer's point could have been made more succinctly and cogently by quoting the
following passage from Judge Bazelon's article Risk and Responsibility; Risk Regulation: A Problem for Democ-
racy in the Technological Age, 205 Sci. 277, 278 (1979): "[Jludges have little or no training to understand and
resolve problems on the frontiers of nuclear physics, toxicology, hydrology, and a myriad of other specialties."
44. Singer, supra note 33, at 334. This would presumably induce prelaw students to study science.
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presses doubt that this proposal will win favor because "the absence on
[LSAT's] of substantive questions of any kind, let alone scientific ones" makes
it appear that "knowledge is irrelevant to the selection of candidates for law
school." 45
The final example of recent scholarship is an editorial by Daniel Koshland,
Jr., in Science.46 In Dr. Koshland's view, "law has become so complicated that
there is almost always a technical flaw or a distant precedent that can allow any
decision." As a consequence, we are fast becoming "a nation of men and not
laws," so that there is not enough predictability to patent an invention, create a
new industry, or make a new chemical. 4 7 His main complaint seems to be that
regulatory agencies are more often than not overruled on the basis of "minor
legal technicalities" that are themselves often overruled after seemingly intermi-
nable delays. Koshland's proposed solution is hardly one to make the law less
complicated. He calls for the judge or jury that overrules an agency or commis-
sion to prepare a "judicial impact statement" to "demonstrate appropriate ex-
pertise in the field and awareness of the consequences of the judgment. 48
The recent law-science literature reviewed above reflects a rather narrow
focus of interest. At best, it begins with detail and makes some movement in the
direction of the peripheries. The approach spelled out in the remainder of this
Article is quite the opposite because it begins with an analysis of the central
roles of law and science in society and works inwards toward greater detail. It
reflects in a very rough manner the way I have conducted my Law, Science, and
Technology Seminar since it was first offered in 1965.41
III. THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL
A good place to begin is to ask, as Goldberg and Merges do, what there is
about science that warrants the special attention of the law and lawyers. In the
remainder of this Article I will try to demonstrate that law schools should offer
courses in the law-science relationship in order to expose students to the process
of public-policy decisionmaking directed towards enabling society to enjoy the
maximum benefits of science and technology without being forced to bear unac-
ceptable risks and other costs.50 Courses in the law-science relationship also ex-
45. Id. at 334-35. Dr. Singer's comment about the irrelevancy of knowledge speaks for itself. One wonders,
however, recalling the apparent deficiencies in Lysenko's science education, whether a little scientific education of
putative lawyers would turn out to be a dangerous thing.
46. Koshland, Judicial Impact Statements, 239 Sci. 1225 (1988).
47. Id. at 1225.
48. Id. One might ask, demonstrate to whom?
49. The seminar was originally styled "Science and the Legal Process," but the name was changed several
years ago. Initially I relied on my own mimeographed (prephotocopying!) materials, which examined issues such
as the use of radar to control highway speeding, blood grouping tests to establish nonpaternity, fluordation of
public water supplies to prevent dental caries, and the use of radiation-producing technology. Later, as societal
concerns changed, I reduced the attention given to radiation and spent time on biotechnology. Since publication of
the Areen, King, Capron, and Goldberg case book, I have abandoned my own materials and have used materials
in that book as points of departure for discussion of the basic issues. See J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A.
CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE (1984).
50. In many respects, my seminar concentrates on the role of the law and lawyers in cost-benefit and risk-
benefit assessment. Risk is, of course, a component of cost.
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plore the action of law in a dynamic process that involves very high stakes for
the future of. American society and perhaps mankind itself. The primary focus
of such courses should be on the way law (as a body of rules, as a process for
decisionmaking, and as a discipline) reacts and responds to new challenges re-
sulting from scientific advances. 51 This approach is consistent with the views
expressed by Professor Milton Wessell, former Director of the Center for the
Study of Law, Science and Technology at Arizona State University's College of
Law. 52 He finds that "the need for our legal system to deal more satisfactorily
with the rapidity of change resulting from technological impact" is an "impor-
tant unifying theme."' 53 He defines "law, science and technology" to mean "the
discipline that deals with how our legal system can and must adjust to accom-
modate the problems created by the ever more urgent and ubiquitous impact of
technology on society."' 54 Under this definition, two major functions are in-
volved: (1) "Technology assessment," which includes the timely identification of
concerns so that remedial action can be taken before irreversibility sets in; and
(2) modification of legal practices and institutions to deal more satisfactorily
with the concerns unearthed by technology assessment. 55 Significantly, most
lawyers who have written on the subjects have concentrated their attention on
the ways that the legal system should be altered to accommodate the ways of
science, and virtually no attention has been given to the alternative of helping
scientists adapt to the legal system.
Scientists seem to have a clearer view of the need for law to interact with
science than do lawyers, although their points are not always sharply focused.
The tremendous potential impact of this relationship was recognized as early as
the mid-1930s, when the question of the capability of societal institutions to
regulate new technology was raised by the Natural Resources Committee, cre-
ated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to consider the significance and deploy-
ment of the country's natural resources in overcoming the depression. Interest-
ingly, at that time, science was considered a natural resource and a Science
Committee was created by the parent body to explore more fully the role of
science as a natural resource. The Science Committee in turn established a
Technology Subcommittee. This Subcommittee's 1937 Report 56 is, in several
respects, a remarkable document that should be closely read by students of pub-
lic policy for science and technology.
The Technology Subcommittee, cognizant of the fact that it was perform-
ing its function at roughly the end of the first third of the twentieth century,
51. Students in my seminar are told at the outset that they will learn nothing substantive during the semes-
ter, except, perhaps, for a few incidental pieces of trivia. However, they are also told that they will have an
opportunity to look at the law in action in a way that they have not had the opportunity to look at it in their prior
law school experience and, moreover, that the arena is of the most critical importance to society. Judging by the
course evaluations, students seem quite pleased with the experience, which, incidentally, is almost 100% socratic.
52. Wessel, What Is "'Law, Science and Technology" Anyway?, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 259 (1989).
53. Id. at 260.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 261.
56. TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMM, UNITED STATES NATURAL RESOURCES COMM. TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS AND
NATIONAL POLICY (1937) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMM. REP.].
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
undertook to evaluate the "unparalleled" technological advances5" that had oc-
curred during that period and their consequences to society. The Subcommittee
also undertook to peer into the future in order to predict the course of techno-
logical progress during the coming second third of the century. This latter en-
deavor was wildly short of the mark,58 not even hinting at nuclear energy, ra-
dar, computers, or the jet engine, all of which were in existence only a few years
later. In fact, the Report suggested that civil aviation had largely run its course
and that future developments would lie mainly in safety and comfort rather
than speed. 59
The Report also discussed society's ability to take timely action necessary
to bring rapidly emerging technologies under effective social control. It con-
cluded that there was no cause for concern because "from the early origins of
an invention to its social effects the time interval averages about 30 years."6
The experience of the past half-century demonstrates, however, that this time
interval has shrunk dramatically and that the social effects of new technologies
may be almost instantaneous. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that many
presently emerging technologies will bring with them destructive social effects
dramatically greater than those previously experienced. 61
Twenty years after the publication of the Technology Subcommittee Re-
port, scientists began discussing the competence of their disciplines to play a
leadership role in coping with the fruits of scientific and technological growth.
In a report published in 195712 a Committee of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) catalogued some of the increased uses of
scientific knowledge that "generated new hazards of unprecedented magni-
tude."63 This report was not concerned with any relevance that these develop-
ments had to law; quite the opposite, it was a plea to scientists, qua scientists, to
become more involved in the political process, a development that was already
well under way. Beginning towards the end of World War II, scientists who
were involved in the development of the atomic bomb embarked upon a major
political effort to bring the enormous destructive capabilities of atomic weapons
under effective control.64
57. Id. at 3. The members of the Science Committee were Frank Lillic, E.B. Wilson, J.C. Merriam, E.C.
Elliott, C.H. Judd, W.D. Cocking, William F. Ogburn, H.A. Millis, and Carter Goodrich. The Technology Sub-
committee consisted of Ogburn as Chair, Merriam, and Elliott. Id. at iv.
58. It is tempting to speculate on the reasons. Certainly, the Subcommittee could not have predicted the
war or the military technologies that would be so quickly developed, nor could it have predicted that after the war
the federal government would make a massive commitment to the financial support of science and technology.
59. This observation was not included in the Report itself, but rather in an annexed study of transportation
technology prepared by Harold A. Osgood, an iron company executive. Osgood seemingly accepted the conclusion
based on his quotation of an unnamed aviation executive. TECHNOLOGY SuBcoMM. REP., supra note 56, at 200.
60. Id. at ix.
61. These social effects may be destructive not only in their potential to cause physical injury, but also in
their impact on moral and spiritual values and the very nature of humanity.
62. Report of the AAAS Interim Committee on the Social Aspects of Science, 13 BULL ATOM. SCIENTIStS
81 (1957).
63. These hazards include "the dangers to life from widely disseminated radiation; the burden of man-made
chemicals, fumes, and smog of unknown biological effect which we now absorb; large scale deterioration of our
natural resources; and the potential of totally destructive war." Id. at 85.
64. See A. SMITH, A PERIL AND A HOPE (1965), for a description of the early involvement of the atomic
scientists in politics.
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Writing in 1965, Ralph Lapp, one of the atomic scientists involved in this
effort, took an approach rather different from that of the AAAS committee.
Lapp was concerned about the future of mankind because the time lag between
science and technology was constantly decreasing, thus raising the possibility
that "[b]y the time the necessity for the control of the technology becomes ap-
parent the problem may be too advanced for adequate solution."65 His worry
was not that scientists would not have influence, but rather that the professional
policymakers' scientific illiteracy would lead them to abdicate the making of
decisions to the scientists. Two years later, Nobel Laureate Dr. Glenn T. Sea-
borg, then Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, spoke in the same vein
when he noted that "man's ability at technological innovation has far outstrip-
ped his ability at social innovation. '66
Although the concerns of Lapp and Seaborg are not expressly addressed to
the role of the law in coping with the impact of science on technology, it is
obvious that social control over technology must come about through the mak-
ing of law by courts and legislatures. Another commentator, one of the pre-
eminent technologists, was less reticent. Speaking at the Philadelphia Bar Asso-
ciation's Law Day observance in 1964, Admiral Hyman Rickover, the "father
of the nuclear navy," discussed the "potential for injury to society" created by
the pressures exerted by technologists on individuals to alter their lives. Admiral
Rickover said that it was "almost as if technology were an irrepressible force of
nature to which we must meekly submit" and called upon the legal profession to
protect society from the onslaughts of technology "as a special civic
responsibility."67
Lawyers trained in Anglo-American jurisprudence understand that our le-
gal system aspires to reconcile the desire for stability with the necessity for
change. Although science per se usually does not directly inspire a need for
change in the law, it breeds technology, which frequently does. Indeed, it has
been stated that science is "disruptive of the juridical order. '68
It is remarkable that the legal profession has not raised or responded to the
question of how society can best bring about timely and effective control over
new technologies. A quarter of a century after the question was first raised by
scientists and engineers, legal scholars still have contributed very little to its
answer. It is difficult to believe, for example, that the 1968 American Assembly
Report, Law in a Changing Society, 9 neither considered nor mentioned the role
of law in the context of the scientific and technological revolution. Lawyers, it
would appear, are not uncomfortable with being viewed, and viewing them-
selves, as litigators, judges, scriveners, and counselors, who eschew any signifi-
cant role in broader issues of public policy decisionmaking that are not directly
related to the law.
65. R LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD 30 (1965).
66. Address before the Industrial Research-100 Award Banquet, New York, AEC Press Release S-36-67
(Sept. 19, 1967).
67. Rickover's address was printed at 110 CONG. REC. S10,478-81 (1964).
68. See DeJouvenal, The Political Consequences of the Rise of Science, 19 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 2
(1966); Methene, Can Only Scientists Make Government Science Policy?, 145 Sc. 237 (1964).
69. Report of the American Assembly on Law and the Changing Society, 54 A.B.A.J. 450 (1968).
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IV. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
To understand the law-science interface, it is necessary to look at the way
law responds to the stimuli of scientific developments-indeed, to look generally
at the way law is made and changed in our society.
Science, like all human activity, takes place within a societal environment
that provides incentives, deterrents, or neutrality with respect to the particular
activity. The institutions of government are the primary sources of these influ-
ences and are vehicles for expressing law. In a developed society it is primarily
the law that creates the societal environment in which scientific activity takes
place.
It is possible to offer some generalizations about the societal environment
for science in the United States. The Anglo-American political-economic-legal
system has always placed a high premium on individual freedom. People, and
the entities they create, have the freedom to pursue their individual interests so
long as they do not improperly impinge upon the interests of others. Those who
want to engage in scientific research may presumptively do so, just as those who
want to play chess, throw a ball, or make and sell clothing, for example, may
engage in those activites. There is no law that explicitly authorizes these activi-
ties; none is necessary because our legal system, in the absence of some specific
incentive or deterrent, is neutral and gives people the freedom to act as they
wish.
But American law has never been strictly neutral with respect to science.
Congress has established patent and copyright systems to promote the progress
of science as it is explicitly authorized to do under the Constitution.70 It is clear,
therefore, that the law views science with at least some degree of benevolence.
Moreover, although there is no solid support for the proposition, the first
amendment appears to protect at least some aspects of scientific activity.71 But
although the Constitution may extend to science a certain protected status, it
does not shield science from government regulation and restriction to the extent
that scientific activity may be injurious to health, life, safety, public order, and
other legally protected interests. On the other hand, our society's benevolent
attitude towards science is reflected in the fact that since World War II, the
federal government has provided very substantial funding for scientific educa-
tion and research.
Viewed as a purely intellectual activity, science rarely will have a sufficient
impact on society to warrant restriction or regulation. In this respect, an anal-
ogy can be drawn to the speech-action dichotomy under the first amendment.
That is, the first amendment protects pure speech, but this protection does not
necessarily extend to actions that are outgrowths of that speech.72 Similarly,
70. US. CONST. art. I, § 8.
71. See Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific
Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REv. 349 (1978); Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of American Science, 1979 UNIV.
ILL. L.F. 1; Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL L. REv. 1203
(1977).
72. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1965). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N.
YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16.37-16.40 (3d ed. 1986) (discussion of fighting words doctrine).
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purely intellectual aspects of scientific research might be protected, but physical
results that flow from these endeavors might be subject to regulation. It is only
when science, as a purely intellectual pursuit, leads to experimentation or tech-
nology that such impacts can be perceived. 73
It is not common in our political system to establish statutory rules to deal
with hypothetical or future problems. Premature regulation may force a new
technology to develop along lines that may prove unwise or less than optimal in
the light of actual experience.74 There are also practical, political considerations
militating against such regulation. Legislators are usually busy enough attempt-
ing to cope with immediate pressing problems, leaving little time or incentive to
expend their efforts and political capital dealing with issues that may never
materialize.
Accordingly, when science or its consequences have an impact on legally
protected interests, it is likely, in the earlier stages of the impact, that courts
will be called upon to extend common law rules, or perhaps even statutory rules,
that evolved in quite different contexts. 75 When the automobile came into being,
for example, the initial reaction of the courts was to apply the rules of the road
applicable to horse-drawn vehicles.76 Thus, the response of the courts to
problems bred by new technology is a trial-and-error process, often slow and
uncertain in developing rules for the effective control of new developments in
the public interest. As a consequence, unacceptable injuries may result, prompt-
ing legislatures to preempt the decisionmaking process by intervening to enact
positive rules. The fact that unacceptable injury may result in the interim is a
price we pay for a society that places so high a value on individual initiative and
freedom. Of course, it would be preferable for the legislatures to step in at an
earlier point; however, there is no button that can be pushed to ensure action,
let alone wise action, by legislators.
In short, it is unusual for legislatures to act on a substantive matter until
the demonstrable need for action is widely recognized and pressed. Even then,
legislation may not follow. A good example is the issue of recombinant DNA.
In response to considerable clamor for Congress to enact regulatory legislation,
several bills were introduced, and hearings were held, but in the end even the
sponsors of the bills backed off in the face of a near consensus by the scientific
community that legislation was not necessary." This does not mean that the
73. It can be argued that science, even as a purely intellectual activity, has the potential for being trans-
formed into activity that may involve harm and, therefore, warrants restriction or regulation.
74. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1982), is an exception to the proposition that
legislators usually avoid enacting statutes to deal with hypothetical or future problems, and the present plight of
nuclear power may, indeed, be a consequence of the adoption of a detailed regulatory blueprint before there was
anything to regulate. See Green, Lessons of Three Mile Island for the Institutional Management and Regulation
of Nuclear Power, 365 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 311 (1981).
75. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. Although it may ultimately be necessary to establish a regula-
tory structure explicitly directed towards recombinant DNA technology, lawmakers to date have concentrated on
extending an amalgam of pre-existing environmental and health statutes to the new technology.
76. See, e.g., Wright v. Crane, 142 Mich. 508, 510, 106 N.W. 71, 71-72 (1905): "There is no doubt that
owners of automobiles have the same rights . . . that the drivers of horses have."
77. See Perpich, Genetic Engineering and Related Biotechnologies Scientific Progress and Public Policy,
and Schmitt, Biotechnology and the Lawmakers, in BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY: PRIVATE INITIATIVES AND PUB-
LIC OVERSlGHT 65, 87 (J. Perpich ed. 1986).
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issue will not be revisited in the future, but new legislation will probably be
considered only if something happens to suggest strongly that the hazards are
greater than previously believed. This example also demonstrates the principle
that by the time scientific developments ripen into technology, powerful vested
interests 18 will have developed. Groups representing these interests will argue
cogently, because they generally control the relevant data, that legislation is
unnecessary or premature.
Admiral Rickover accurately described this process when he pointed out
that after first attempting to confuse the issue by arguing as if a law of science
were at issue, the vested interests supporting the status quo continue as follows:
If this argument fails, the need for the proposed law is then categorically denied.
Warnings of scientists are rejected as "unproven" or "exaggerated." Later . . . the
argument shifts to an attack on the legitimacy of any kind of protective legislation.
Such violation would violate basic liberties, it is claimed; it would establish govern-
ment tyranny and subvert free democratic institutions. If all this is futile and legisla-
tion is imminent, there will be urgent demands that it be postponed until "more re-
search" can be undertaken to establish the appositeness of the proposed law.79
The development of the vested interests makes the process of imposing effective
social controls very difficult. As a consequence, social controls are usually im-
posed only after (too often long after) substantial injury has been sustained by
the public.
There is, of course, an interplay between the legislature and the judiciary.
Not infrequently, the legislature acts to replace a common-law legal principle
with a direct statutory principle. It is, however, the function of the courts to
apply the statutory language in particular cases, and in so doing, the courts are
faced with the task of interpreting the language. The important point is that it
is always within the power of the legislature to amend the statute to correct
what it regards as an erroneous interpretation or application of the statute. On
the other hand, legislators not infrequently find themselves unable to agree on
statutory language, and implicitly resolve the stalemate by enacting a deliber-
ately ambiguous statute and bucking the issue to the judiciary."
A key role has also been played by administrative regulatory agencies es-
tablished by the legislatures to promulgate rules and regulations in order to
implement, by making more specific, the relatively general provisions of organic
statutes. Such agencies often enforce the statutes and the rules and regulations.
They perform a function that in earlier, simpler times would have been per-
formed by the legislature itself, but which the legislatures, recognizing the in-
creasing complexity of modern life, have now opted to assign to expert, or at
least specialized, government entities. Principles of separation of powers and
judicial supremacy have brought functions of the agencies under judicial re-
78. The phrase "vested interests" is not used invidiously. It embraces the consumers who enjoy the benefits
of the technology as well as the economic and political interests that may profit from the application of the
technology.
79. A Humanistic Technology, Address by Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, Granada Guildhall Lectures of
the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Oct. 27, 1965).
80. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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view."" More important, but less recognized, is the fact that the agencies are
creatures of the legislature, and they only have authority to perform the func-
tions delegated to them by statute. Deviations from policies acceptable to the
legislature are always immediately correctable by legislative enactments and,
indeed, by less formal mechanisms such as hostile hearings, political pressures,
and cuts in appropriations. Of course, even those agencies structured to be inde-
pendent of the executive branch 2 are subject to its influence through both the
budgetary process and the power to appoint and reappoint administrative
agency members or heads. Moreover, agency decisions are always subject to
legislative review and revision, as are judicial decisions concerning agency ac-
tions. These considerations point towards the reality that decisionmaking by
regulatory agencies and the courts, where public policy issues are involved, is to
some extent a part of the political process.
Regulatory agencies may aspire, and are expected, to reach decisions on
scientific and technical issues that will be regarded as "correct" by scientific
consensus. There are, however, political realities that frequently tend to weigh
against this goal. First, the outcome of any decision is necessarily shaped by the
statutory mandate under which the agency operates, and the statutory language
may require an "incorrect" decision. For example, a statute may focus solely on
the elimination of risk and not allow for the balancing of risk against benefit,
thereby producing a result that is enormously and disproportionately costly to
society83 or widely condemned by scientific consensus.84 Second, the agenda and
policy attitudes of agency heads are inevitably shaped to some extent by the
executive who appoints them. This is due to the fact that the executive chooses
her nominees with regard for their likely willingness to implement the execu-
tive's own policy goals. Third, the agency's decisions are necessarily constrained
by political realities, such as the political and public relations costs of antago-
nizing key players in the executive and legislative branches, concerns about the
possibility of being criticized or overruled by the legislature, and the personal
interest of the agency heads in their own political careers.
As Goldberg noted, 5 a major distinction between law and science is that
the law emphasizes process, while science emphasizes progress. In a sense, the
scientist's vision of progress is also closely related to truth. Obviously, science
does not seek progress at any cost; its interest is in letting science go forward in
the march to progress unless and until it reliably appears that a particular for-
ward step involves genuine, unacceptable costs. Along with Maxine Singer88
and The New York Times,87 science deplores the influence not only of the scien-
81. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
82. For example, by the establishment of agencies with multiple heads serving fixed staggered terms.
83. A good example of this is the Delaney clause of the Food and Drug Act, which bars the use of any
chemical food additive that is known to cause cancer in animals. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1984). See infra note
134.
84. See Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's Guide to Food Safety Provisions of the
Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 77 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1978).
85. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
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tific charlatans but also of lawyers and judges who are scientific know-nothings.
The law, on the other hand, is more concerned with the optimal resolution of
disputes than it is with achieving "correct" decisions that accord with objective
truth. Although the law aspires to decide issues correctly, it is also concerned
with reaching decisions that will be acceptable to the public. The legal process
gives each party the maximum opportunity to make its case as strongly as it can
in an adversary context, with the decision to be made by an objective fact finder
who has no previous special knowledge of the facts in the case. The underlying
premise is that such a decision will be more acceptable to the public than one
based on scientific pronouncements ex cathedra. This is, of course, the judicial
analog to a democracy's legislative process. Few would accept the proposition
that laws emerging from the legislative process are based on objectively true
premises, but we prefer these decisions to those emanating ex cathedra from a
dictator, however benign, benevolent, and omniscient.
V. CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE INTERFACE ARISES
The formulation and implementation of public policy decisions relating to
science require the participation and, hopefully, the collaboration of scientists
and lawyers.88 The remainder of this Article will explore the manner in which
law and science, and their respective dogmas, meet in several decisionmaking
contexts. We will first consider the law-science interface in the context of litiga-
tion involving scientific issues. Second, we will explore the relationship in the
context of prospective rulemaking by legislatures or regulatory agencies. Fi-
nally, we will consider the respective roles of law and science in decisions relat-
ing to public funding of scientific research and development.
A. Litigation
An instructive example of the tensions between law and science is found in
a straightforward case, Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,8" decided in 1985
by Judge Shoob of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. The plaintiff, Katie Wells, was born in 1981 with a number of serious
birth defects.90 Her parents sued individually and on her behalf, alleging that
the birth defects were caused by a vaginal spermicide product, Ortho-Gynol
Contraceptive Jelly, which had been on the market for about thirty years and
had been used by millions of women."' The product was manufactured by the
defendant and had been used by the plaintiff's mother for several months both
prior to and after conception until she became aware that she was pregnant.92
88. See generally LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION (J. Nyhart & M. Carrow eds. 1983); SCIENCE
AND LAW: AN ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE (W. Thomas ed. 1983); SCIENTISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: TOLERATED MED-
DLERS OR ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS? (W. Thomas ed. 1974).
89. 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
90. Id. at 267-68.
91. Id. at 268.
92. Id. at 269.
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In a two-week bench trial, each side presented a battery of expert witnesses
whose testimony Judge Shoob found to be "in direct conflict."'93 Under these
circumstances, he defined his task as follows:
[N]ot to presume the expertise to resolve, once and for all, the dispute within the
scientific community about the safety of spermicides. Rather the Court's function was
to render a legal decision, not a medical one. That is, the Court's duty was to weigh
carefully the evidence that these parties presented to this court in the trial of this case
and to determine with reference to the facts of the case at hand whether plaintiffs had
satisfied their burden of proving that they were entitled to the relief sought. 4
He emphasized that the plaintiffs' burden was not to produce "an unassailable
scientific study which proves that spermicides have caused birth defects . . but
rather to show from all the evidence presented, to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty that the spermicide caused some or all of Katie Wells' birth
defects."95
Judge Shoob then devoted the bulk of his lengthy opinion to a detailed
summary of the testimony of each witness and his views as to the credibility
each should be given. His ultimate finding of fact was:
Plaintiffs presented competent evidence that the Product had proximately caused Ka-
tie Wells' birth defects, and this evidence generally was credible. Defendant offered
evidence that the Product was not the proximate cause of these defects, yet this evi-
dence often lacked credibility because it reflected bias or inconsistency. Accordingly,
the Court found to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the Product had
proximately caused the birth defects of Katie Wells' left shoulder and arm and right
hand.96
The judge awarded damages of about $5.1 million.97
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, but reduced the
damages by about $400,000.98 The Court of Appeals considered and rejected
Ortho's contention that "epidemiological studies should be relied on to provide
the essential data to formulate an opinion on causation."9 9 The court noted,
however, that in addition to evidence based on personal medical examinations of
the child and medical and scientific studies relative to causation, the plaintiffs'
experts presented several epidemiological studies indicating an association be-
tween spermicide use and deleterious effects on the fetus. 100 Since the studies
presented by both sides were inconclusive on the issue of whether the product
had caused the birth defects, the trial court "was thus forced to make credibil-
ity determinations 'to decide the victor.' "1
93. Id. at 266.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 294.
97. Id. at 296-98.
98. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 747-48 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950
(1986).
99. Id. at 744. The court defined "epidemiology" as "the field of science dealing with the relationships of
the various factors which determine the frequencies and distributions of certain conditions and diseases in human
populations." Id. Cf. the New York Times' definition, infra text accompanying note 106.
100. 788 F.2d at 744.
101. Id. at 745 (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984)). Also quoting Ferebee, the Court stated that a "cause-effect relationship need not be clearly
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The scientific community responded to this case with great vigor. The usu-
ally cautious New York Times dealt with the case in an emotional editorial
entitled Federal Judges vs. Science.'0' The editorial referred to an assertion by
the New England Journal of Medicine that the courts would no longer be
bound by reasonable standards of scientific proof and went on to spell out the
reasons why it regarded the descision in Wells as grossly erroneous. According
to the Times, there was "no serious difference among experts" as to the safety
of the product because "after reviewing some 20 epidemiological studies, an
expert committee advised the Food and Drug Administration in 1983 that the
preponderance of available evidence 'indicates no association' between spermi-
cides and birth defects.' 03 The editorial complained that Judge Shoob, trying
the case without a jury, rejected the written evidence of the scientific literature
and focused on the oral testimony presented, paying "close attention to each
expert's demeanor and tone."'" 4 He chose to believe the plaintiff's main wit-
nesses, three pharmacologists and an expert in birth defects, "none of whom
had any expertise in epidemiology,"'' 05 which the Times characterized as "the
science of determining the causes of disease."'' 0 6 According to the Times, "sci-
ence's finest achievement is finding methods to raise objective evidence above
the merely anecdotal,"'' 7 but Judge Shoob was not moved by the preponderance
of the scientific evidence, nor was the Court of Appeals, which "espoused the
fiction that there had been a battle of experts, even though no scientist would
consider pharmacologists expert in a matter of epidemiology."'' 08 According to
the Times, the Eleventh Circuit rejected scientific standards of evidence when it
upheld Judge Shoob's decision because there was "sufficient evidence of causa-
tion in the legal sense in this particular case, and that . . . finding is not clearly
erroneous."' ' The Times labelled Judge Shoob's and the Court of Appeals'
position an "intellectual embarrassment" that could have profound practical
consequences in driving spermicides off the market and further narrowing con-
traceptive choice for women." 0
More recently, Carl Djerassi, a Stanford chemist who synthesized the first
oral contraceptive, described the finding of causation in the Wells case as "a
possibility inconsistent with current epidemiological evidence" and asserted that
fear of litigation and unavailability of insurance have eliminated most competi-
tion in development of new contraceptives."'
established by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship
exists." Id.
102. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1986, at 22, col. 1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Wells, 788 F.2d at 745).
110. The Times editorial pointed out that Ortho's profit on the spermicide product was only $3 million per
year. Id.
111. Djerassi, The Future of Birth Control, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1989, at c, cal. 1.
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Wells is an excellent vehicle for discussing a number of important issues
relating to the respective roles of law and science in American society, the law-
science interface, and the role of expertise in public policy decisionmaking for
science and technology.
1. The Role of Science
Scientists play a crucial role in formulating society's safety standards and
resolving disputes over whether a particular agent caused injury to a plaintiff. It
is essential to bear in mind, however, that that there is a substantial difference
between the skills and data necessary to make determinations concerning safety
and those required to make determinations concerning the cause of a particular
malady. For example, epidemiologists are capable of making judgments where
data are available, as they were in Wells, about the correlation between a vagi-
nal spermicide and birth defects. Even if every single use of the spermicide
could be documented, without a single birth defect in the case of a child born to
a user of the product, it does not follow that a birth defect will never be caused.
This is another way of stating that a negative cannot be proved. It does follow,
however, if the sample is large enough, that scientists and regulators could val-
idly conclude that the product is safe. It also follows that the manufacturer of
the product should not be liable for negligence because it had no reason to be-
lieve the product could cause birth defects. But in Wells, according to Judge
Shoob's findings, there was credible evidence that showed some causal link be-
tween the product and birth defects,11 2 and the manufacturer was held liable in
negligence for not labeling the product to warn users that an increased risk of
birth defects might result from use of the product.113
2. The Role of Law
The legal system has no competence to determine the abstract issue of
whether spermicides in general or particular spermicides cause birth defects or
other injuries.11 4 The system does, however, have the duty to decide, in accor-
dance with established legal procedures and on the basis of all the evidence
presented by the parties, whether use of the spermicide caused injury in the
particular case before the court. Whereas science can duck issues of this kind
by asserting that the evidence is inconclusive, a court does not have this luxury.
When a lawsuit is filed, the case must be decided in a binary manner: liability
or no liability. Moreover, in the Anglo-American legal system, responsibility for
managing the case rests with the judge, who probably has no scientific compe-
tence; and responsibility for actually deciding the issue of causation rests with a
112. 615 F. Supp. at 292. The defendant's epidemiologist witness testified that epidemiological studies had
shown clearly that spermicides do not cause birth defects. Id. at 285. Nevertheless, on cross-examination, the
witness conceded that "a small increase [in birth defects] cannot be ruled out." Id. at 286.
113. Id. at 292-94.
114. Law is, however, competent to assist in formulating processes for making such determinations.
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jury of lay persons.'1 5 This does not mean that the court's decision is objectively
valid. It cannot be flatly asserted that the Ortho-Gynol spermicide in fact
caused Katie Wells' birth defects. The only certainty is that in this particular
case, at this particular time, and before this particular judge, the evidence
presented by these particular witnesses with the help of these particular attor-
neys led Judge Shoob to conclude that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient show-
ing of causation to warrant his finding liability rather than no liability. Accord-
ingly, it cannot be stated that the case was correctly decided in accordance with
objective fact, but it probably was decided in the optimal manner from the soci-
etal standpoint.
Both the court and scientists had legitimate roles to play relating to the
safety of Ortho-Gynol. One function of scientists was to advise the Food and
Drug Administration for regulatory purposes as to the product's safety; another
function was to provide testimony on behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant as
to whether a causal relationship existed between the product and the specific
injury. The function of the court was to determine whether Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cal Corp. should be liable for Katie Wells' birth defects. This illustrates a fun-
damental principle that should be applicable to any risk or benefit-cost assess-
ment; that is, it is essential that the purpose of the assessment be specified and
understood. The criticisms of the treatment of scientific expertise in Wells
would have much greater cogency and validity in a case directly involving the
question of whether the product was safe rather than a question of whether a
particular injury was caused by the product.
3. The Validity of the Decision
Aside from the above considerations, the Wells decision and the reaction to
it raise other questions relating to public comprehension of what courts are
about. It is difficult to believe that very many unbiased lawyers would regard
the opinions and decisions by Judge Shoob and the Court of Appeals as unrea-
sonable. Accordingly, it is also difficult to understand the emotion and the zeal
for attacking the legal system generated by the decision, particularly in view of
the factual underpinnings set forth in the opinions.
The New York Times editorial characterized the courts' decisions in the
Ortho-Gynol case as an "intellectual embarrassment." Its principal complaint
seems to have been that the trial court ignored the accepted scientific wisdom
(emanating from epidemiology) in favor of the testimony of "three pharmacolo-
gists and an expert in birth defects, none of whom had any expertise in epidemi-
ology.""' The Times' obsession with epidemiology is puzzling, indeed almost an
intellectual embarrassment itself. Epidemiologists would probably be startled to
learn that their discipline is "the science of determining the causes of dis-
ease." 1 7 And while it may be true that "no scientist would consider pharmacol-
115. One who possessed relevant scientific knowledge would almost certainly be excluded from the jury. Of
course, when a case is tried without a jury, as in Wells, the findings on causation are made by the judge.
116. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1986, at 22, col. I.
117. Id. Random House defines "epidemiology" to mean "the branch of medicine dealing with epidemic
diseases." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 479 (1966) [hereinafter RANDOM, HOUSE].
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ogists expert in a matter of epidemiology," scientists would probably be sur-
prised to learn that pharmacologists are not expert in "the science dealing with
. . . the effects of drugs," 1 8 which, after all, was the issue in the case.
In fact, the defendant called seven expert witnesses, only one of whom was
an epidemiologist, and that witness testified that "a small increase [in birth
defects] cannot be ruled out" as a result of spermicide use.'"9 The defendant's
other experts were a biochemist; a physician certified in emergency medicine
who had been involved in some epidemiological studies of birth defects; an ob-
stetrician-gynecologist employed by the defendant's corporate parent; a "profes-
sor of pediatrics, radiology, and anatomy" (whom the court characterized as the
defendant's primary witness); a pharmacist; and a regulatory specialist em-
ployed by Ortho who had a bachelor's degree in biology."' Judge Shoob's opin-
ion makes no reference to any documentary evidence presented by the defend-
ant that purported to be a definitive epidemiological study generally accepted
by the scientific community as establishing that spermicides are not a cause of
birth defects.
The plaintiff called four expert witnesses on the causation issue: a pharma-
cologist; a physician-pharmacologist; a general surgeon; and a physician "certi-
fied in pediatrics, chemical genetics, and biochemical and metabolical genetics"
whose research area was the "study of the effects of drugs and environmental
agents on developing fetuses."12 The plaintiff presented, through direct testi-
mony and cross-examination, evidence in epidemiological studies of some link
between vaginal spermicides and birth defects.
Since the evidence presented by the two sets of experts was directly contra-
dictory, the case necessarily hinged on how much weight the judge attached to
the particular items of evidence before him. He found the plaintiffs' expert testi-
mony "generally to be competent, credible, and directed to the specific circum-
stances of the case," while the defendant's testimony "often indicated bias or
inconsistency." 22 If one assumes that the judge accurately and fairly character-
ized the testimony of the experts, his conclusion about these matters seems to be
sound and reasonable, although not necessarily correct.
In short, the decision in Wells cannot be fairly characterized as wrong or
as right on the issue of causation. The issue had to be decided one way or the
other. Some epidemiological studies suggested a causal link between use of
spermicides and birth defects; others were sufficiently persuasive that the Food
and Drug Administration decided no warning label was necessary. 213 The judge
weighed the conflicting evidence and decided that the plaintiffs should prevail.
This does not mean that the spermicide caused the birth defects as a matter of
118. Random House defines "pharmacology" as "the science dealing with the preparation, uses, and espe-
cially the effects of drugs." RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 117, at 1079.
119. 615 F. Supp. at 286.
120. Id. at 279-88.
121. Id. at 269-76.
122. Id. at 267.
123. The fact that no warning label was deemed necessary by the FDA does not necessarily mean that the
FDA regarded the product as totally without risk in some eases.
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objective truth, but only that this particular dispute was resolved in this manner
in accordance with the usual legal dispute resolution processes.
4. The Consequences of the Decision
Merely because the case was decided in a legally proper manner does not
mean that the decision was sound or desirable from the standpoint of public
policy. However, this was not a matter that should have been of great concern
to Judge Shoob. The impact of the substantial liability imposed on the drug
manufacturer, compounded by the liability imposed on the manufacturer of the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive device, 124 has apparently operated as a
serious deterrent to contraceptive research by the pharmaceutical industry.125
The industry and the majority of the scientific community seemingly regard this
as a public policy tragedy unjustified by what they consider to be the small risks
of these products.
This is not the first, nor will it be the last, occasion on which a judicial
decision has been widely condemned as producing tragic social consequences.
But there are ways to correct the situation short of turning the legal system
upside down to mollify those who are complaining. The fix is, of course, political
and legislative. It is within the power of state legislatures and the Congress to
create new legal rules to prevent similar disasters. Dollar caps could be placed
on liability. Standards for determining the culpability of drug manufacturers
could be tightened through statutes that would protect manufacturers of speci-
fied products from liability for punitive damages unless it is established by
"clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the
reckless disregard of the manufacturer or product seller for the safety of prod-
uct users." 2' Indeed, to satisfy the New York Times, the legislature could even
specify that heavier, perhaps decisive, weight should be given the testimony of
epidemiologists as to the cause of particular ills. 127
To one concerned about the public policy consequences of the Wells deci-
sion, the inaction of legislative bodies to negate these consequences is at least as
blameworthy as the asserted deficiencies of the judicial process. But the resolu-
tion of conflict is even more subjective and uncertain in the legislative setting.
First, unlike a court, which must decide a matter properly before it one way or
the other, legislatures are free simply to ignore whatever they choose. Moreover,
legislators are expected to act as politicians rather than as objective, impartial
arbiters. Important legislation is typically the product of political compromise
124. A number of courts, state and federal, have upheld verdicts against A.H. Robins Co., manufacturer of
the Dalkon Shield. See, e.g., Craig v. A.H. Robins Co., 790 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1986); Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co.,
734 F.2d 676 (11th Cir. 1984); Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 374, 196 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1983);
A.H. Robins Co. v. Ford, 468 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441,
738 P.2d 1210 (1987).
125. See Djerassi, supra note 111; Birth Control Industry Is Being Transformed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1989, at DI, col. 4; Drug Firms Halting Contaceptive Study, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 8, 1989, at Cl, col. 2.
126. S. 100, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a)(1), 131 CONG. REC. 5221 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985).
127. These possibilities are merely illustrative. Legislatures have available tothem a wide variety of mea-
sures that would protect the pharmaceutical industry against the consequences of such judicial outcomes.
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and, necessarily, cannot be expected to reflect an objectively correct disposition
of an issue.1 2 a
Thus, neither the courts nor the legislatures acting alone or in concert can
be expected to intervene at an appropriate time to bring a technology's evolu-
tion under social controls that will reflect a "correct" and scientifically objective
balancing of its costs and benefits. Of course, a problem exists in defining what
is correct and scientifically objective given that there is rarely unanimity among
scientists on any particular subject. However, as Goldberg points out, a near
consensus generally exists among scientists on scientific judgments, making it
rational for policymakers to rely upon the views of the scientific community. 29
Nevertheless, even if Goldberg is correct, a more vexing problem remains: who
qualifies as a "scientist" for purposes of establishing the existence of a consen-
sus? This is a genuine problem, as is evident from the New York Times' view
that only epidemiologists are, and pharmacologists are not, "experts in birth
defects." 30
B. The Rulemaking Process
It is instructive and useful to contrast litigation such as Wells, which fo-
cuses on the question of whether liability should be imposed on a defendant as a
consequence of injury allegedly caused by him in the past, with the process of
making prospective rules prohibiting or regulating particular products or activi-
ties. In the latter procedure the focus is not on whether liability should be im-
posed, but on whether a particular product or activity involves risk such that it
should be subject to restrictions in order to protect the public from injury.
The rulemaking process is essentially legislative. Indeed, although we tend
to think of safety rulemaking as a function performed by administrative regula-
tory agencies, the legislature may, and frequently does, make the determina-
tions itself.131 Even where the determination is made by an administrative
agency, however, the agency is exercising a portion of the legislature's power
delegated to it by the legislature, using the basic standards for decisionmaking
spelled out in the organic statutes. Indeed, one of the difficulties with under-
standing "safety" in a regulatory context is that different statutes define the
concept differently.13 2
128. Paradoxically, despite the concept of legislative supremacy in a democratic society, we accept the pre-
mise that legislatures act subjectively, arbitrarily, or perhaps even irrationally, and our society expects a greater
degree of "correctness" from the courts, much of whose business consists of deciding cases in accordance with the
statutory output of the legislatures, and almost all of whose decisions are subject to legislative rejection or revision.
129. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 372-73.
130. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
131. See Green, The Role of Law in Determining Acceptability of Risk, 363 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCl. 1, 3-4
(1981).
132. For example, the 1958 Chemical Food Additives Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act,
particularly in the light of their legislative history, seem to call for reasonable certainty that no harm will result
from the proposed use of an additive. On the other hand, the Consumer Product Safety Act seeks to protect
against "unreasonable risk of injury," as does the Toxic Substances Control Act. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act requires standards that assure "to the extent feasible" that "no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health or functional capacity." Green, supra note 131, at 6-10.
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Neither the legislature nor the agency is constrained in rulemaking, in the
way a court is in litigation, to consider only the evidence introduced by contend-
ing adversary parties. Each is free on its own initiative to search out the data it
believes to be relevant. Nor is it constrained to engage in the kind of careful
assessment and weighing of evidence that is the responsibility of a court. The
rulemaking process, whether by the legislature or by a regulatory agency, is
largely political. 133 Nevertheless, we as citizens hope and expect that the func-
tion will be performed with a degree of objectivity in assessing evidence that is
sometimes inconsistent or conflicting.
Rulemaking in the arena of public health and safety is based on experi-
ence, prediction, or a mix of both. Where there has been experience with a
product or an activity for a sufficiently long time, a body of data may exist,
permitting a judgment as to the correlation, if any, between the product or ac-
tivity and certain safety consequences. This judgment can be the basis for a
regulatory determination of whether the product or activity is safe enough to be
permitted without restriction, whether it should be permitted subject to regula-
tion, or whether it should be curtailed or prohibited. Although, as noted above,
epidemiological studies tell us nothing certain about the cause of a specific ill-
ness or injury affecting a specific individual, they can inform us of the
probability that such an illness or injury may result from the product or the
activity. However, the epidemiological inputs cannot be exclusively controlling.
The fact that no such correlation is shown by existing data does not necessarily
mean that new data resulting from future experience will not show a correla-
tion. Conversely, the fact that a correlation is shown does not necessarily mean
that the product or activity is unsafe. Whether it is adequately safe is a function
of how adverse its consequences may be and the balance between the risks and
benefits (taking into account the costs and risks of alternative means of achiev-
ing like benefits) .134
Scientists' predictions may also enter into safety determinations. When the
scientific community was reaching a judgment forty years ago about the safety
and efficacy of artificially fluoridating drinking water to minimize dental caries
in children,1 35 the Public Health Service's unequivocal determination that it was
safe was based on the fact that the morbidity and mortality rates were no
higher in areas of the country with naturally fluoridated drinking water than in
133. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 164-70. The validity of this proposition is subject to possible statu-
tory language that defines the manner in which safety determinations are to be made. For example, the Delaney
clause in the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1984), defines as unsafe any chemical
shown to cause cancer in humans or animals. In recent years the Food and Drug Administration has interpreted
this provision more flexibly by reading into it a de minimis principle. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,572 (1987). The courts,
however, have tended to be more rigid. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
135. See Wollan, Controlling the Potential Hazards of Government-Sponsored Technology, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1105, 1125 (1968). The Surgeon General of the United States announced the Public Health Service's
"unqualified endorsement" of fluoridation to the extent of one part per million in April 1951. F. MCCLURE,
WATER FLUORIDATION: THE SEARCH AND THE VICTORY 249-55 (1970).
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areas with extremely low fluoridation levels. 36 These epidemiological conclu-
sions were supplemented with the predictive judgment that drinking water laced
with artificially supplied fluoride would be essentially identical to drinking
water in which fluoride occurred naturally 3 " (that is, that there were no envi-
ronmental factors associated with the presence or absence of naturally occurring
fluoride that might make a significant difference in morbidity or mortality
rates).
The conclusion that fluoridation of drinking supplies was safe appears in
retrospect not to have been unreasonable. On the other hand, even if this con-
clusion is one hundred percent valid, it does not mean that drinking fluoridated
water may not result in injury to some individuals. In this context, the safety
determination means only that the risk of injury is so minimal and the antici-
pated benefit so substantial that the measure is, like vaccination against a con-
tagious disease, justifiable. Nor does this conclusion mean that four decades of
epidemiological data are enough to provide assurance that the risk is in fact so
minimal.' 3 1
The prediction of scientists is an even more important factor when it is
necessary to make safety judgments about a technology when there has been
little, if any, prior experience on which to rely. Nuclear power technology is a
good example. Usually, a major new technology is introduced over an extended
period of time on an incremental basis in which experience with each step pro-
vides confidence for going forward with the next step. Each step is taken in
response to market forces, which include a reckoning of the costs of potential
liability incident to the technology's hazards, and regulation is not imposed until
experience demonstrates that there are safety concerns requiring regulation to
supplement market constraints. As indicated in the discussion of Wells,13 9 when
there is a threat of substantial liability, and insurance is unavailable or ex-
tremely expensive, private enterprise may be highly reluctant to undertake so-
cially useful technological development.
The case of nuclear power technology, however, was highly unusual. Con-
ceived in secrecy during World War II, its promise was such that as a conse-
quence of various social and political influences, a national policy commitment
was made to bring the technology to fruition as quickly as feasible through
government support. 40 Although the initial policy was one of government mo-
nopoly,""' the Atomic Energy Act of 19541 opened the technology to private
136. C. RHYNE & E. MULLIM, JR. FLUORIDATION OF MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY: A REVIEW OF THE SCIEN-
TIFIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS 8-13 (1952).
137. Testimony of Dr. Bruce Forsyth, Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Chemicals
in Food and Cosmetics, House of Representatives, 82d Congress, 2d Sess. 1635-37 (1952).
138. There are some recent indications that the predictive judgments may have been somewhat off target.
See, e.g., Marshall, The Fluoride Debate: One More Time, 247 Sci. 276 (1990).
139. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
140. This commitment was implicit in the original Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989)). It directed the new Atomic Energy
Commission to assure "adequate scientific and technical accomplishment" and "the broadest possible exploitation
of the technology." 60 Stat. 755, 756.
141. See Green, Nuclear Technology and the Fabric of Government, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 124-25
(1964).
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investment and exploitation. Recognizing that this technology involved substan-
tial risks to the health and safety of the public,'43 the Act included a detailed
scheme and structure for stringent regulation of the industry, even though it
was not yet in existence. On the other hand, the Act called for rapid develop-
ment of the technology, and as matters worked out in practice, the regulation
was as benign as it was stringent.144 Moreover, since private enterprise balked
at investing in a technology that could give rise to enormous liability, 45 the
1957 Price-Anderson Act amendments created a scheme for government indem-
nity and a cap on liability that in effect insulated the industry from public lia-
bility in the event of an accident.146 Accordingly, because there was virtually no
experience with nuclear power plants and because the deterrent effect of the
liability mechanism had been eliminated, protection of the health and safety of
the public against a catastrophic accident rested entirely with the predictive
safety judgments of knowledgeable nuclear power experts-nuclear scientists
and engineers. 41
Risk is generally considered to be the product of the probability of an event
times the magnitude of the adverse consequences that may result. 48 When one
seeks to measure the risk of a low probability-high consequence occurrence such
as a catastrophic accident in a nuclear power plant, the multiplication will yield
a very small number if either of the multiplicands is a very small number. Even
though by definition of the problem, the adverse consequences are high, a very
large number, the overall risk will turn out to be small if the probability of the
occurrence is determined to be very low. This probability can easily be manipu-
lated downwards simply by being optimistic about the efficacy of safety devices.
Throughout the history of nuclear regulation, the probability of a catastrophic
accident has been characterized by verbal formulations such as "extremely re-
mote," "exceedingly remote contingency," "low probability," "remote possibil-
ity," and "highly improbable event."' 49 This kind of characterization has pro-
vided a rationale for ignoring worst-case scenarios.'5
Although the safety of nuclear power has been an extremely controversial
issue for the past two decades, the controversy has for the most part pitted
knowledgeable scientists and engineers against opponents with substantially in-
142. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-
2296 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989)).
143. The 1954 Act referred explicitly to protection of the health and safety of the public more than 20 times.
See id.
144. Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A Critical View, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
633, 643-47 (1968).
145. Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 479, 481-87 (1973).
146. Id. at 487-91.
147. Id. at 491-98. Although it is true that there had been virtually no experience with land-based, stationary
nuclear power plants, there had been considerable experience with naval nuclear propulsion systems.
148. See, e.g., W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 75-101
(1976).
149. These euphemistic phrases and others like them are found in a 1966 report of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on legislation to amend the Price-Anderson Act. H.R. REP. No. 2043, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
150. For an official description of this policy and its subsequent revision after the Three Mile Island accident,
see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Statement of Interim Policy, Annex to Appendix D, 36 Fed. Reg.
22,851 (1971) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 50) (withdrawn Nuc. Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 1059 (June 13, 1980)).
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ferior knowledge and technical resources. During the past decade the introduc-
tion of new nuclear power facilities has been brought to a standstill without any
legislative prohibitions or deterrents, but rather by harrassment, agitation, and
litigation spawned by opposition groups whose efforts have made nuclear power
"too hot to handle" in the political arena. A strong case can be made that this is
another example of a Lysenko-type paralysis that deprives society of a vitally
needed energy source that the knowledgeable scientific expert consensus holds
to be not only optimal, but also quite safe, at least relative to the hazards of
other energy sources. 151
This raises a fundamental question: can the experts be trusted? Clearly,
they are the only ones who can be trusted to design and oversee the construction
and operation of nuclear power facilities to ensure their adequate safety. They
are also the only ones who can be trusted when they tell us that a facility meets
all regulatory requirements and that the possibility of a major accident that will
affect the public is very remote. They also have something useful to say about
the potential consequences of such an accident, although they rarely discuss it
because the exceedingly low probability of the accident makes it irrelevant to
them. Similarly, they can contribute to a discussion of the risk-benefit balance,
subject to the caveat that they have no particular knowledge of what benefits
the public wants and what risk the public is willing to assume to achieve those
benefits. 152 On the other hand, they cannot be credited with either omniscience
or infallibility. For the political and legal systems to place blind faith in the
experts would require us to believe that they have considered all that is relevant,
constructed defenses against all possibilities, and taken into account the vagar-
ies of both nature and human behavior. In short, it would be necessary for the
public to repeal the most important of all laws: Murphy's Law.153
It is also significant that scientific judgment about the safety of nuclear
power is not consistent with some important institutional indicators. Insurance
underwriters, who are the real professionals in risk assessment, apparently re-
gard the risks of nuclear power technology as sufficiently real that they are
willing to provide only a small fraction of the liability coverage required by the
nuclear industry. Moreover, the nuclear industry itself apparently regards the
risks as sufficiently real that it has been unwilling to construct and operate nu-
clear power facilities without the continuing protection of the Price-Anderson
151. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty (1976).
In these respects, the situation resembles that in the contraceptive area, where it has been argued that verdicts
against manufacturers of vaginal contraceptives operate to reduce drastically the birth control options available to
women.
152. Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Nuclear Power Licensing, in NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC
(H. Foreman ed. 1970).
153. Charles Perrow argues convincingly that serious accidents are inevitable in high technologies such as
nuclear power. C. PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS (1984). In the introduction to his book, he offers this warning:
The new risks have produced a new breed of shamans, called risk assessors. As with the shamans and
physicians of old, it might be more dangerous to go to them for advice than to suffer unattended. In our
last chapter we will examine the dangers of this new alchemy where body counting replaces social and
cultural values and excludes us from participating in decisions that a few have decided the many cannot
do without. The issue is not risk, but power.
Id. at 12.
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Act. This latter point is particularly significant because the dollar amount of
nuclear accident coverage provided is many times greater than the maximum
liability coverage ever previously offered for a single accident not involving
atomic energy. 54 An important question to be pondered is whether there may
not be some activities that are so dangerous that they ought not to be permitted
even if the probability of an accident is virtually zero.
It is also important to recognize that although the question of whether par-
ticular products or activities meet statutory and regulatory safety standards is a
question of law, the question of what constitutes adequate safety is one for the
legislature to resolve in the crucible of the political process. The legal profes-
sion's concern with process should not be limited to litigation procedures, but
should extend as well to the manner in which law is made by legislatures. This
brings us back to the role of scientific expertise. As with respect to other issues,
such as civil liberties, economic and tax policy, and the fitness of nominees to
serve on the Supreme Court, the legislative process should consider the views of
all segments of the public, expert or know-nothing, rational or irrational. Error
is inevitable in free debate, as Justice Brennan pointed out, 55 but it can be
tolerated, even where the issue is one of science. Nevertheless, if error results, it
can be more easily tolerated if its effect is to retard progress rather than to
result in injury to the public. After all, to retard progress is only to postpone the
enjoyment of benefits not previously available.
C. Public Funding of Scientific Research and Development
Decisionmaking on safety issues involving government-sponsored projects is
an important special case. When confronted with this question in my seminar,
students almost invariably assert their belief that government-sponsored devel-
opment and introduction of a technology involves less risk to the public health
and safety than if the technology were to be developed and introduced by pri-
vate enterprise. This reaction flows from the students' beliefs that private profit
motivation is antithetical to safety and that the lobbying power of private enter-
prise will forestall effective regulation. One of the major themes of the seminar
involves the exploration of this question.
Prior to World War II, there was relatively little federal support of scien-
tific research and development. Since then, however, a major proportion of all
research and development done in the United States has been conducted with
government sponsorship and funding. The scientific establishment has become
so dependent upon federal funding that there has been a tendency to call gov-
ernment decisions not to fund particular projects "prohibition" or "suppression"
of research or technology. 156
154. See Green, supra note 145, at 483-84.
155. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
156. See e.g., Dyson, Death of a Project, 149 Sci. 141 (1965), characterizing the government's decision not
to expend additional funds on Project Orion (which sought to develop a system for propelling spacecraft by the
detonation of small hydrogen bombs that would be thrown out by the craft) as the suppression of technology. Id.
at 144.
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Much of the government support is committed to basic research or to ap-
plied research that does not directly involve major technological advance. It
should be noted, however, that such research increases the pool of scientific
knowledge, provides building blocks for future technological development, and
therefore serves to accelerate the general advance of technology. Some govern-
ment support is, on the other hand, committed specifically to new technological
advances. Examples of such support over the past several decades are nuclear
power, weather modification, the supersonic transport, AIDS and cancer re-
search, and the artificial heart.15 7 In each of these cases the justifications for
government support have been that development of the technology was in the
public interest and that the marketplace would not produce sufficient private
investment to yield adequate technological development on the requisite time
scale.
Unlike private investment, government support is not motivated by signals
from the market; indeed, government investment is made in defiance of these
signals. Therefore, the cost of potential liability arising from the hazards in-
volved in the technology does not operate as a deterrent to the government to
the same extent as it does in the private sector. Moreover, unlike the case of the
private sector, where government regulation often takes over after the fledgling
technology passes the test of the marketplace, technological development by the
government is not subject to government regulation. Since there are no eco-
nomic or regulatory constraints on potentially hazardous developments, the only
constraint is the government's self-restraint.
Although, hopefully, the political process does not permit the government
to make its decisions irresponsibly or recklessly, we must acknowledge that the
bureaucracy and its contractors have powerful vested interests in going forward.
The inevitable tilt, therefore, is towards overstating benefits and understating
risks. This tilt is accompanied by sincere professions of belief that progress
should not be deterred by speculative and hypothetical risks, that the risks will
turn out not to be too great, and that those risks can probably be minimized by
technological fixes. Then comes the ultimate promise: If it turns out that the
risks are unacceptably high, we will abandon the whole thing. It is unlikely,
however, that a government bureaucracy will find it politically feasible to aban-
don its promotion of a useful civilian technology after strong vested interests in
both its use and its enjoyment have come into existence."' 8 After all, the process
of assessing benefits and risks is sufficiently soft and subjective to enable good
faith continuation of the project on the basis of a finding that the benefits ex-
ceed even the confirmed risks.
157. Of course, the development of military technology is an extremely important area of government fund-
ing, but for obvious reasons it is excluded from the scope of this Article.
158. In Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S.
396 (1961), the Supreme Court interpreted the Atomic Energy Act as permitting the AEC to defer a definitive
safety finding until after the commission issued a construction permit and received the application to operate the
nuclear power plant. Id. at 406. Justice Douglas was highly skeptical that this would adequately protect the
public. He said: "[W]hen millions have been invested, the momentum is on the side of the applicant, not on the
side of the public. The momentum is not only generated by the desire to salvage an investment. No agency wants
to be the architect of a 'white elephant.'" Id. at 417.
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Bringing government-sponsored research and development projects that
may involve hazard under effective control is a particularly challenging puzzle.
On the one hand, it appears that once a project gathers momentum, it will be
very difficult, perhaps impossible, to turn it off. On the other hand, a society
that does not proceed with a project merely because it involves risks of an un-
known, but possibly substantial, degree would never make technological pro-
gress. To complicate the problem further, an objective risk-benefit assessment
performed at the outset of the project would almost invariably result in a con-
clusion that the benefits clearly outweigh the risks. This is because the potential
benefits are usually obvious and relatively imminent, while the risks are specula-
tive, hypothetical, relatively remote, and, in any event, possibly manageable and
acceptable. From the scientists' standpoint, the assessment would always lead to
the conclusion that the project should go on at least until we know more about
the risks.
One possible answer to this dilemma may be for government to get out of
the business of supporting science and technology, so that market forces and
regulatory structures could operate. This would mean, however, that our society
would be deprived of the earlier enjoyment of technological benefits. On the
other hand, there is no political or ethical imperative that the government must
procure technological benefits, even a cure or therapy for cancer, for its public
in the same manner that it procures police and fire protection. The problem is
easier to define than to answer, particularly since there are international dimen-
sions that must be taken into account.
VI. DICHOTOMIES IN THE LAW-SCIENCE INTERFACE
In considering the law-science relationship in the public policy context, we
encounter a number of fundamental dichotomies that are at the heart of the
tensions between law and science.
The first dichotomy involves the conflict between progress and process.
When Koshland complains that a technical flaw, distant precedent, or minor
legal technicality frequently delays scientific or technical advance, 159 he is say-
ing in essence that it is the lawyers' process that causes the delay. This implic-
itly raises the dichotomy of the respective roles of experts and generalists in
public policy decisionmaking for science and technology, an issue that is raised
more explicitly by Dr. Singer.1 60 This in turn leads to the question of whether
issues of science and technology are so unique and important that they should
be resolved in some kind of extraordinary forum rather than in the manner in
which other major societal issues are decided. 16'
159. Koshland, supra note 46.
160. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
161. During the 1970s Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz proposed the establishment of a "science court." Kantrowitz,
Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SCIENTIST 505 (1975). The underlying premise is that the deci-
sionmaking process can and should separate the scientific (i.e., facts) from the nonscientific (i.e., values). The
science court (in which lawyers would play no, or at best a minimal, role) would determine the scientific facts, and
its decision would then be turned over to the more conventional decisionmaking institutions for application of
value and political judgments. Id. at 506-08. Proponents of the concept have never dealt with the difficult question
of how constitutional due process requirements could be met.
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A second dichotomy centers upon the role of government in procuring sci-
entific and technological advance. Scientists, perhaps because of their economic
dependence on federal support,162 tend to regard government funding of science
as mandated by the welfare clause of the Constitution.163 Serious questions arise
as to how multitudinous beneficial research projects should be prioritized in
light of limited available funds. Scientists tend to favor technological, rather
than social, fixes for social problems. For example, when fluoridation of public
water supplies was under consideration as a fix for dental caries in children,
there is no record that any serious thought was given to legislation mandating
periodic visits to the dentist, or restricting the manufacture and sale of candy
and chewing gum. Similarly, scientists, who play the de facto key role in the
process of prioritization among competing scientific projects, seem to have a
predisposition for high-technology projects rather than low-technology public
health measures. Finally, very little thought has been given to the alternative of
government stimulation or subsidization of regulated private enterprise to per-
form this procurement function.
Another dichotomy involves the issue of quantitative versus qualitative as-
sessments of risks and benefits. Scientists have a clear preference for, indeed an
insistence upon, quantification. As Dr. Philip Handler noted when he was presi-
dent of the National Academy of Sciences, in government safety regulation de-
cisions "an attempt is required to state both the costs and benefits in quantita-
tive form,"' 64  even though difficulties stem "from the seemingly
incommensurable nature of these risks and benefits, which may even accrue to
different populations."'16 5 Nevertheless, Dr. Handler concedes that in most regu-
latory situations "knowledge of risks is rather imperfect and knowledge of bene-
fits is likely to be decidedly less satisfactory."' 66
The legal profession is no stranger to risk-benefit assessment. In the law of
torts, for example, where conduct creating an "unreasonable risk of harm" to
others may give rise to liability, "unreasonable" is defined in terms of the risks
outweighing the benefits ("what the law regards as the utility of the act or the
particular manner in which it is done"). The risk is measured by the social
value the law attaches to the interests imperiled, the probability that injury will
result, the magnitude of the likely injury, and the number of persons who may
be injured. "Utility" is a function of the social value the law attaches to the
interest to be advanced or protected by the conduct, the probability that the
interest will be advanced or protected, and the availability of less dangerous
alternatives to advance or protect the interest. 67 All of this is done without any
quantification. Indeed, in one case Judge Learned Hand constructed an alge-
braic formula to be applied to ascertain liability and then proceeded to give
162. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
163. See Green, Law and Genetic Control: Public Policy Questions, 265 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 170, 176-
77 (1976) for the author's colloquy on this point with Dr. Bernard Davis.
164. Handler, A Rebuttal. A Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Government Regulation, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 808, 809 (1975).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 808.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-96 (1965).
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content to the algebraic terms in a purely nonquantitative analysis that included
consideration of custom in the industry.16 8
Of course, Dr. Handler's remarks about quantification were made in the
context of regulatory decisions, not torts cases, but it is not clear that quantifi-
cation is really a sine qua non of regulatory risk-benefit assessments."6 9 Indeed,
from the standpoint of public acceptance of regulatory decisions, it is probably
preferable for the agency to communicate its conclusions about risk in words
rather than numbers. For example, the public would undoubtedly be more com-
fortable if it is told that the probability of a serious accident is "exceedingly
remote" than if it is told it is "10-6"' (one in a million). 70 In any event, there
would appear to be no harm in a regulatory agency's use of quantitative risk-
benefit assessment if it so chooses, as long as the results are not presented to the
public as being anything more than an educated "guesstimate."
This leads directly to another dichotomy: probability versus magnitude of
consequences. It has been observed that the general public tends to give much
more weight to the magnitude of the consequences of an accident than to its
probability. Thus the risk of an enormous catastrophe in the highly remote pos-
sibility of a severe nuclear accident causes greater public apprehension than the
mining and use of coal for energy, even though scientific consensus regards the
risk-benefit ratio as much more favorable for nuclear power. 7 '
Finally, there is the dichotomy of experience versus prediction. The com-
mon expressions about experience ("experience is the best teacher," "there is no
substitute for experience") reflect a deep-seated predisposition. Our economic,
political, and legal systems are all constructed to resist sudden, dramatic
change, but to accommodate incremental change. Since World War II, science
168. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 189 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Seven years earlier, in a case involv-
ing an automobile accident, Judge Hand had defined the degree of care required of the defendant as "the resul-
tant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness'of the injury if it
happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk." Conway v. O'Brien, 11
F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1941). He stated that none of the three factors was practically
susceptible to quantitative estimate, and that the latter two were not even theoretically susceptible. Accordingly,
since a solution always involves some "choice between incommensurables" the choice is assigned to the jury "be-
cause their decision is thought most likely to accord with commonly accepted standards, real or fancied." Id.
Interestingly, Judge Hand applied similar principles in a rather different context. In United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), he wrote for the Second Circuit in affirming the convic-
tion of the "first string" leadership of the Communist Party that applying the "clear and present danger" test
requires "a comparison between interests which are to be appraised qualitatively" Id. (emphasis added). The
appraisal that was necessary was to determine whether the "gravity of the evil" that might be produced by the
Communist Party, "discounted by its improbability," justifies the invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the
danger. Id. at 212.
169. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm., 569 F.2d 831, 840 (5th Cir. 1978) ("elabo-
rate cost-benefit analysis" not necessary to conclude that unreasonable risk exists); H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976), part of the legislative history of the Toxic Substances Control Act, which asserts that
the cost-benefit assessment required under that statute does not require a "formal benefit-cost analysis under
which a monetary value is assigned to the risks . . . and to the cost to society."
170. Dr. Handler acknowledges that "to establish that untoward incidents will not occur with a frequency
greater than 10.6 is a monumental task." Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 791, 796 (1975).
171. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181 (R. Schwing & W. Albers, Jr. eds. 1980); Slovic, Fischhoff &
Lichtenstein, Characterizing Perceived Risk, in PERILOUS PROGRESS: MANAGING THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY
91 (R. Kates, C. Hohenemser & J. Kasperson eds. 1985).
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and technology, however, have in effect been leap-frogging experience with suc-
cessive revelations and developments occurring before there has been an oppor-
tunity to absorb previous ones.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers should have a profound interest not only in what the law is but in
how the law is made. This proposition applies not only to those lawyers who
have a client interest in the subject matter of the law, but also to the legal
profession as a whole in its role as architects of public policy. This is particu-
larly true with respect to the scientific revolution of the past five decades and
the technological consequences it has spawned. The stakes are very high in view
of the potential of science for both good and evil.
There is a substantial gulf between the scientific and legal disciplines. Al-
though this gulf has been characterized by some in terms of antagonism, there
is no reason to conclude that the interface involves real antipathy on either side.
The scientific community has been reluctant to become involved with lawyers,
but this seems to be a function of its perception that lawyers are merely med-
dlers with little capacity to be of assistance to science in its efforts to improve
the store of knowledge and the human condition. There has also been a funda-
mental lack of communication between the disciplines, largely because of the
legal profession's failure to recognize the weighty public policy issues requiring
its attention.
The law school world has, of course, been aware of the migration of scien-
tists and engineers into law school. Many of these migrants have been motivated
by an interest in public policy for science issues and have sensed that the law is
where the public policy action takes place. It is questionable whether law
schools have delivered on these expectations.
In any event, the challenge is not to make scientists literate in law, to make
lawyers literate in science, or to create a new breed of lawyer-scientist or scien-
tist-lawyer. Rather, it is to teach the lawyer and the scientist, each doing her
thing, to achieve common goals.
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